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This paper examines the impact of individual human operators on the fuel efficiency of power plants.
Although electricity generation is a fuel and capital intensive enterprise, anecdotal evidence, interviews,
and empirical analysis support the hypothesis that labor, particularly power plant operators, can have
a non-trivial impact on the operating efficiency of the plant. We present evidence to demonstrate these
effects and survey the policies and practices of electricity producing firms that either reduce or exacerbate
fuel efficiency differences across individual plant operators.
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In this paper we explore the impact of labor policies on the operations of electric power plants.
At ￿rst glance, it might seem that workers should have little scope to in￿uence the performance
of the electricity industry and that this should be particularly true of the generation sector of the
industry, where costs are dominated by the capital required to build plants and the fuel required
to operate them. Overall, labor costs constitute a small fraction of generation costs. Yet, in
extensive interviews with plant managers and utility executives in the US and Europe, most
expressed the belief that the individual skill and e￿ort of key personnel could make a signi￿cant
di￿erence in the performance of generating plants.
We focus on the role of the plant operator, an individual whose decisions have direct impact on
many facets of plant operation. We describe both anecdotal evidence drawn from our interviews
and empirical analysis documenting that individual operators do in￿uence the e￿ciency of plant
operations. The existence and tolerance of such an ‘operator e￿ect’ might seem counter-intuitive.
The cost of fuel in power plant operations is orders of magnitude greater than the salary of any
individual operator. The savings in fuel costs reaped by highly skilled operators far outweigh
any pay premiums they earn.
Having documented the existence of an operator e￿ect, we describe circumstances where
companies have taken steps to foster the practices of e￿cient operators and discourage those
of ine￿cient ones. Generally, however, these appear to be the exception more than the rule.
Because labor makes up such a small fraction of industry costs, it is possible that managers have
not made human resource polices a priority. Further, it seems likely that the history of regulation
in the industry dampened the incentives for operational e￿ciencies both among managers and
workers. This trend may begin to change with the adoption of various forms of regulatory
restructuring throughout the industry.
This paper is related to an emerging empirical literature that uses high frequency data to
measure productivity di￿erences across workers (see, e.g., Hamilton, Nickerson, and Owan (2004),2
Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2005), and Mas and Moretti (2007)). While the previous work
has focused on measuring the impacts of the workers’ environments on their productivity (e.g.,
teams, compensation scheme, and co-workers), we focus on the size of the di￿erences in pro-
ductivity across workers at the same ￿rm. Worker heterogeneity is not ordinarily captured in
descriptions of ￿rm e￿ciency based on production functions, but may be an important compo-
nent of technical e￿ciency di￿erences across ￿rms. We also place a straightforward economic
value on the productivity di￿erences across power plant operators, and show that it is quite large
relative to the pay received by the workers.
We begin by giving a general description and historical overview of the electricity industry.
We then describe the power production process and the key role of plant operators in that
process. We present empirical evidence, drawn from shift and production data from several U.S.
power plants, that operators can indeed have a non-trivial impact on plant e￿ciency. We then
conclude with a discussion of labor policies in the industry and describe some isolated attempts
to confront and take advantage of the di￿erences in operator skill and e￿ort levels.
2 The Electricity Industry
The electricity industry provides a foundation for much of the industrial and commercial activity
in the developed world. In the US, total sales in 2004 were nearly $300 billion per year, making
electricity industry revenues comparable to those in the automotive, petroleum products, and
telecommunications industries. Yet the industry has typically been viewed as a sleepy one, where
innovation, quality improvement, and e￿ciency e￿orts have not yielded the rewards garnered in
other industries.
Historically, electricity was viewed as a natural monopoly industry. Typically, a single utility
company generated, transmitted and distributed all electricity in its service territory. In much
of the world, the monopoly was a state-owned utility. Within the U.S., private investor-owned
companies supplied the majority of customers although federally- and municipally-owned com-
panies played an important minority role. These companies operated under multiple layers of3
local, state and federal regulation.
A primary feature of regulation or government ownership, was that revenues were based on
costs rather than market factors. Under a typical rate-of-return regulatory structure, electric
utilities would be responsible for making investments and operating power systems such that the
demand of its franchise customers was met. In return operating expenses would be recovered
fully from rates, and capital expenditures would earn a guaranteed rate-of-return. Typically, only
the most egregiously wasteful expenditures would be overturned by regulators. It has long been
observed that this form of \cost-plus" pricing structure naturally weakens incentives for cutting
costs and improving e￿ciency of operations.1 The lack of direct competition also made the
industry relatively amenable to unionization. The electricity industry has traditionally featured
one of the highest union membership rates among U.S. industries. Although deregulation and
restructuring has reduced that rate somewhat, as of 2001 the membership rate was around 30%,
higher than telecommunications and trucking, and more than twice the level of the U.S. workforce
overall.2
Industry Structure
The electricity industry is comprised of three main sectors, generation, transmission, and
distribution. The generating sector encompasses the power plants where electricity is produced
from other energy sources. The transmission system transports the electricity over high-voltage
lines from the power plants to local distribution areas. The distribution system includes the local
system of lower voltage lines, substations, and transformers which are used to deliver the elec-
tricity to end-use consumers. Administrative activities associated with billing retail customers
are often included with distribution. Each sector is strongly di￿erentiated from the others in
operating characteristics. Transmission is capital intensive, with minimal labor and operat-
ing costs. While the natural monopoly arguments for distribution point to the large capital
costs associated with replicating the distribution system, from an accounting perspective, most
1Joskow (1997) gives a detailed overview of the history and performance of the industry in the US, and of the
forces pushing regulatory restructuring and reform.
2See Niederjohn (2003).4
of the capital in the sector is extremely long-lived, so the main accounting costs are related to
operating and maintaining the distribution system. In the US in 2006, about 40% of the over
400,000 employees in the industry worked in distribution and, aside from approximately 25,000
in transmission, the remaining worked in generation.3
Within the generation sector, fuel accounts for the bulk of the expenses. For fossil-￿red
steam generation units, fuel accounted for about 75% of power plant operating costs in 2003 and
still over half of the expenses when capital costs are included.4 By contrast, labor expenses
are less than 10% of total generation costs. Although power plants can be extremely large,
complex, and expensive facilities, the fundamental process is the conversion of fuel (usually fossil
fuel) into electricity. Since fuel is the dominant input into this production process, even small
improvements in the e￿ciency at which fuel is converted into electricity (usually through an
intermediate conversion into steam), can result in signi￿cant cost savings.
However, within the paradigm of cost-of-service regulation, e￿ciency of fuel conversion is
usually taken to be an immutable, exogenous characteristic of operations rather than a parame-
ter within management’s control. In the United States, rates often contained fuel adjustment
clauses, that would allow for automatic adjustment to electricity rates based upon the costs
of fuel consumed by the utility. Thus fuel costs for many utilities were automatically passed
on to customers. Although incentive mechanisms have been applied to certain activities, they
have rarely extended to fuel consumption within the regulatory framework. One plant manager
interviewed for this project indicated that, under regulation, management would not seriously
consider an investment aimed solely at improving the e￿ciency of fuel conversion.
By contrast, environmental considerations can be powerful drivers of investment and oper-
ational decisions, both under regulation and competition. A common theme to our interviews
was the high degree of focus on how plant operations could be modi￿ed to deal with emissions
restrictions, or other environmental concerns such as water temperature. The design of the plant
3This information is from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Employment, Hours and Earnings from the Current
Employment Statistics" survey. Information for the industry overall is is based on NAICS code 2211, while the
generation, transmission and distribution sectors are ￿ve-digit subsets of this.
4This ￿gure is also taken from EIA’s Electric Power Annual.5
and the actions of individual operators can have impacts on these environmental factors. In
many cases the goals of fuel-e￿ciency and emissions mitigation are in con￿ict with each-other.
For example, an oxygen rich fuel mix can reduce NOx emissions, but also reduce fuel-e￿ciency.
Regulatory Restructuring and Market Liberalization.
Over the last two decades, governments in many countries have privatized and restructured
their electricity industries. Restructured electricity markets now operate in much of Europe,
North and South America, New Zealand and Australia. These changes were primarily motivated
by the perception that the previous regimes of either state ownership or cost-of-service regulation
yielded ine￿cient operations and poor investment decisions. Restructuring of the electricity
industry also re￿ected the natural progression of a deregulation movement that had already
transformed infrastructure industries, including water, communications and transportation, in
many countries.
Within the United States, electricity restructuring has proceeded unevenly, driven by state-
level initiatives. Restructuring has reached an advanced level in much of the Northeast, Califor-
nia, Illinois and Texas. By contrast, the organizational and economic structure of the industry
in most of the Northwest and Southeastern US remains unchanged from the 1980s.
Restructuring is primarily aimed at the generation sector. Within restructured markets,
wholesale electricity is sold at market-based, rather than cost-based prices. Many power plants
have been divested to non-utility owners, many of which have been unregulated a￿liates of the
former utility owners. During the period from 1998 through 2004, the industry has also experi-
enced an enormous amount of investment in new generation facilities by non-utility operators.
There is some evidence that restructuring, and the ensuing changes in the incentives of
generation ￿rms, has had an e￿ect on e￿ciency in the industry. Bushnell and Wolfram (2006) ￿nd
that fuel e￿ciency rates at divested power plants improved roughly 1-2% relative to non-divested
plants. Aggregate statistics suggest that employment in the industry has declined substantially,
from over 550,000 in 1990 to 400,000 in 2005. Figure 1 plots employment relative to 1990 both for6
the whole industry, and, beginning in 1997 when employment is broken out by ￿ve-digit NAICS
code, distinguishing between the generating sector and the transmission and distribution sector
of the industry. At least post-1997, the major cuts in the industry were driven by employment
reductions at power plants. While these trends are suggestive of a regulatory restructuring e￿ect,
there could have been other factors driving the reductions. The results in Fabrizio, Wolfram and
Rose (2007) suggest that restructuring was at least partially responsible for the decline, as they
demonstrate that regulated power plants operating in states that passed restructuring legislation
reduced the number of employees and the level of nonfuel operating expenses by more than both
power plants in states that did not pass restructuring legislation and municipally-owned power
plants.
3 Plant Operators and Generator E￿ciency
In this section, we will focus on the largest single cost in the electricity industry, the consumption
of fuel in power plants. Despite the fact that billions of dollars are invested in the research, design,
and construction of power plants, and the fact that labor is a relatively small component of power
plant costs, there is a widespread belief in the industry that the quality of the workforce can have
a non-trivial impact on performance. In particular, the decisions of one key employee, the plant
operator, can a￿ect the e￿ciency with which the plant converts fuel into electricity.
As described above, power plant operations are fundamentally the process of converting
potential energy in fuel into electrical energy. In general, this process can be further separated into
the handling and processing of fuel, the combustion of the fuel, and the generation of electricity
from either the exhaust heat or steam produced by the combustion. Depending upon the fuel
type, technology, and location of the plant, the processing and monitoring of emissions and
other waste products can be another signi￿cant component of plant operations. The complexity
of these individual processes depends upon the speci￿c technology of the plant. The materials
handling and processing is very involved at coal facilities and relatively straightforward at natural
gas plants. The combustion process can either entail burning the fuel in boilers to heat water7
into steam, which in turn rotates a turbine, or the direct use of hot exhaust from combustion to
rotate a turbine. The former technology is often described as steam combustion and the latter a
combustion turbine (CT).
While power plants employ teams of widely varying sizes and roles, all fossil ￿red conventional
power plants sta￿ a plant operator, whose responsibilities are central to the performance of
the plant. The plant operator is primarily responsible for the monitoring and control of the
combustion process.
At more complex plants, such as coal facilities, an operator controls several aspects of the
process that can in￿uence both fuel-e￿ciency and emissions. These include the rate at which
coal mills feed pulverized fuel to burners, or even the number of mills and burners in operation.
The operator controls the mix of oxygen in the combustion process, and through dampers the
mix of air and fuel in the mills. Some boilers also allow for adjustment of the angle or tilt of the
burners within the boiler chamber.
In all cases, these settings are automated to some degree, but the operator has the ability
and responsibility to adjust or override automatic settings in the context of monitoring the oper-
ational status of the generation unit. The degree to which these decisions have been automated
and optimized varies greatly across facilities. As we discuss below, development of automated
combustion optimization systems is an area of active commercial and research interest.
In many interviews plant managers and executives expressed a belief that individual operators
can have a non-trivial impact on the combustion process. Each facility has idiosyncratic aspects
that experienced and motivated operators learn to account for. The act of balancing all of these
input parameters was described by one manager as \playing the piano," and one star operator
was considered a virtuoso on the instrument.
Another important responsibility of plant operators that was often cited in interviews at coal
plants is the operation of soot blowers within boilers. In the combustion process, pressurized
water is run through pipes or tubes and heated by the boilers into steam. As a by-product of8
the combustion, various impurities and uncombusted material form into soot that settles onto
the tubes. The soot forms an insulating layer on the tube that reduces the transfer of heat from
the boiler to the water. To counteract this e￿ect, boilers are equipped with soot blowers to jet
steam at the tubes and knock o￿ the soot.
While the operator needs to ensure that soot does not accumulate to a detrimental level on
tubes, the manner in which the soot is removed can also impact boiler performance. Ideally,
blowers would be operated in a sequence that is calibrated to current boiler operations. Al-
ternatively, one unmotivated operator described in interviews, would \trigger all the blowers at
once and go have a sandwich." Triggering all the blowers can cause excess soot to circulate
throughout the boiler and also reduce the e￿ciency of combustion.
Overall, most managers we spoke to believed that operators could have a non-trivial impact
on the performance of plants. In the next section we present empirical evidence that this is in
fact the case.
4 Measuring E￿ciency Di￿erences Across Operators
In this section we develop an empirical model to test whether individual shifts or operators
impacted the fuel e￿ciency of their power plants. This task is facilitated by the continuous
emissions monitoring system (CEMS) dataset collected by the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA). The CEMS program was developed to monitor power plant emissions systemat-
ically in order to implement environmental controls such as the cap-and-trade system for SOx.
The CEMS data track many attributes of generation unit performance on an hourly basis, in-
cluding the fuel burned and the power output of each facility. We can use these data to obtain
an hourly measure of the fuel e￿ciency of each generation unit.5 We combine the fuel e￿ciency
data with shift information we obtained from several power companies.6 Power plants typically
comprise multiple boilers and turbines, and each boiler-turbine pair is usually referred to as a
5We used a compilation of the CEMS dataset obtained from Platts. The data are described in more detail in
the Appendix.
6In all cases, the speci￿c identity of the operators was masked in the data.9
generating unit. Some multi-unit plants are organized around a single control room, so that
the same plant operator controls multiple units (up to seven in our data). By contrast, some
plants, typically plants with larger units, have separate control rooms for each unit. To mask
their identity, we will refer to the ￿ve entities from which we received shift schedule information
as "Plant A" through "Plant E," recognizing that in some cases, the operator controls less than
the entire plant. The key characteristics of the plants are described in Table 1. Although by
no means a comprehensive sample of U.S. generation technology, they do represent some of the
standard technologies in use in the U.S. today.
4.1 Empirical Strategy
To test for e￿ciency di￿erences across operators, we estimate versions of the following equation:
ln(HEAT RATEijt) = ￿i +￿1ln(OUTPUTijt)+￿2￿ln(OUTPUTijt)+￿3Xijt +￿j +"ijt (1)
where t indexes an hour, i indexes the operator and j a generating unit. We estimate this
equation for each plant for which we have shift-schedule information.
The dependent variable, HEAT RATEijt, is a generation unit’s heat-rate, measured as the
ratio of the heat content of the fuel input (in Btus) per units of electricity output (measured in
kWh). It is inversely proportional to a unit’s fuel e￿ciency and is the industry standard measure
of fuel use. We obtained information on the hourly heat rates from the EPA’s Continuous
Emissions Monitoring System (CEMS) database. As part of the Sulfur Dioxide (SO2) Emissions
Permit program, all electric power plants larger than 25 MWs were required to install pollution
monitoring devices in their smokestacks. They transmit the data from the monitoring devices to
the EPA on a quarterly basis, and the EPA posts it on their website. For some types of units, the
fuel input is calculated based on the carbon in the smokestack, while for others, it is measured
directly.10
The main variables of interest for this study are the ￿i
0s, the operator-speci￿c e￿ects. These
capture the mean di￿erence in heat rates across operators, controlling for the other variables in
the regression. To code them, we needed information on exactly which person was in the control
room during a particular hour. We obtained this kind of detailed shift information from three
US companies covering ￿ve fossil-fuel ￿red plants. Table 1 summarizes information on the ￿ve
plants.
For Plant A, a large coal plant in the Southeast, company personnel transcribed entries from
the operator logs for one unit at the plant for 2003. Though there are two approximately 1000
MW units at the plant, each unit has its own control room and its own operator at any given
hour. Operators are asked to sign into the log when they begin their shift, although for 33% of
the hours (24% of the hours when the plant is producing power), the operator did not sign the
log. We estimate a single operator e￿ect for all hours when the operator information is missing.
The plant operates on a 3-shift schedule, with a morning shift (7AM to 3PM), afternoon shift
(3PM-11PM) and a night shift (11PM-7AM). We have information on a total of 12 people, who
logged anywhere from 120 to 780 hours over the course of the year. Operators who logged few
hours did not necessarily have less industry experience since they could have been assigned mainly
to the second \sister" unit at the plant.
For Plant B, a gas plant with two units in the West, company personnel sent us three years
worth of spreadsheets with the planned shift schedules. The plant operator controls both units
at the same time, so we estimated versions of equation (1) including observations for each unit.
We also include a unit ￿xed e￿ect to capture mean e￿ciency di￿erences across the two units.
These will impact our operator e￿ect estimates to the extent the allocation of output across units
varies systematically by operator. There was a fair amount of operator turnover over the three
years we analyze, as the time period followed the divestiture of the plant from a regulated utility
to a non-regulated merchant ￿rm. Some of the more senior employees at Plant B left to take jobs
with the utility parent in part to maintain their favorable treatment in the company bene￿ts
programs. Also, for some shifts, two people were scheduled as the operator. We estimate a11
separate operator e￿ect for each team, giving us 16 total operator e￿ects, though only 12 distinct
individuals are represented in the data. Plant personnel work 12-hour shifts, either from 7AM-
7PM or 7PM-7AM. Plant B installed combustion optimization software in August 2002 at unit
3 and in August 2003 at unit 4.
Plants C, D and E are all owned by the same ￿rm (Firm X), but the information we have
from this ￿rm is the sparsest. Company personnel gave us two single page printouts with the
schedules for the four di￿erent shifts over two years. The same shift schedules apply to the three
Firm X plants that are located in the same state. This means that shift A is always working at
the same time at all three plants, but the employees on shift A at Plant C are di￿erent from the
employees on shift A at Plant D, and the composition of shift A at a particular plant no doubt
varies over time. Unfortunately, we don’t know anything about the turnover of the personnel
working on the shift. Shifts work for twelve hours at a time, either from 7AM-7PM or from
7PM-7AM. The three plants are also quite di￿erent from one another. Plant C has two natural
gas-￿red units that were still in operation as of 2004 with a combined capacity of 760MW (￿ve of
the units at the plant were already retired). Plant D is a large plant with seven total natural gas-
or oil-￿red units ranging in size from 100 to 700 MWs, with the combined potential to generate
over 2000MW of total capacity. Some of the units are quite old and run infrequently. Plant E is
a natural gas-￿red unit with one unit still in operation.
For all units, we control for the unit output level (ln(OUTPUT)), change in output over
the previous hour (￿ln(OUTPUT)) and the ambient temperature.7 The output variables are
taken from the EPA CEMS database. We obtained hourly temperature (dry bulb temperature
measured in Fahrenheit) by picking the closest weather station from the NOAA surface weather
data base (see: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/servlets/ULCD). We also include dummy variables
for the four hours directly after the unit is started and dummy variables for the type of shift (e.g.
night shift versus day shift).
One issue we confront in estimating equation (1) is the possibility that the choice of output
7Personnel at one of the plants we visited in the UK showed us calculations they do to benchmark the plant ver-
sus a target e￿ciency value and the main adjustments they make are for unit load, starts and ambient temperature.12
level is correlated with the unit’s e￿ciency. This would be the case if, for instance, the plant
operator scaled back output when malfunctioning equipment reduced the unit’s e￿ciency. This
is equivalent to the endogeneity problem faced in estimating production functions (see, for ex-
ample, Griliches and Mairesse (1998), Olley and Pakes (1996), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)).
To account for the possibility that both ln(OUTPUT) and ￿ln(OUTPUT) are endogenous, we
instrument for them using electricity demand within each plant’s state (ln(STATE DEMAND)
and ￿ln(STATE DEMAND)). Since electricity is not storable, plants are dispatched to meet
hourly demand. Depending on congestion on the transmission grid, a plant may serve anywhere
from a very local geographic area to a multi-state area. We take the state level as a reasonable
representation of the average geographic area a plant could serve.
While it might be interesting to examine whether there are di￿erences in the extent to which
individual operators adjust output in response to e￿ciency shocks, we leave that for future
work. Based on our discussions with plant personnel, we perceive that individual operators have
some but by no means complete discretion to respond to e￿ciency shocks. Some of the output
adjustments are purely mechanical, for instance, when a malfunctioning pulverizer reduces the
amount of fuel that can be fed into a plant boiler. Also, many decisions about output are made
by personnel outside the plant, since deciding by exactly how much production should be scaled
back when e￿ciency drops requires coordination across plants in the same geographic area.
4.2 Empirical Results
The ￿0
is from an instrumental variables estimation of equation (1) for Plant A are summarized
in Figure 2. The red squares are at the mean e￿ect for the operator and the blue lines are drawn
over the 95% con￿dence interval. Operator 27 collects all of the missing log entries. Four of
the eleven operators (￿ve including operator 27) had statistically signi￿cantly lower average heat
rates than operator 4, the operator with the highest average heat rate. The estimates suggest
that the best operator achieved an average heat rate that was more than 3 percent lower than
the average heat rate achieved by the worst operator. To gain perspective on the magnitudes of13
the estimated e￿ects, consider that if every operator were able to achieve the same average heat
rate as the best operator, the unit would save approximately $3.5 million in fuel costs each year.8
These savings are no doubt considerably larger than the annual payroll costs for operators.
The coe￿cient estimates on the control variables associated with the speci￿cation of equation
(1) depicted in Figure 2 are reported in column (1) of Table 2. The second to last row in Table
2 also reports the F-statistic on the joint test that all of the operator e￿ects are zero.9 For Plant
A, the F-statistic is 2.23, suggesting that we can reject the hypothesis that all operators are the
same at the one percent level.
Figure 3 summarizes the operator e￿ects estimated for personnel at Plant B, and column (2)
of Table 2 reports the coe￿cient estimates and F-statistic for the speci￿cation used to generate
the e￿ects summarized in Figure 3. As with Plant A, eight of the ￿fteen operators are signi￿cantly
di￿erent from the worst operator and the F-statistics suggests that we can reject that all operators
are the same at better than the .1% signi￿cance level. The operator e￿ects may be more
signi￿cant at Plant B than they were at Plant A because we have three times as long a time
period for Plant B, so the estimates are tighter. The range of operator e￿ects is smaller for
Plant B than it is for Plant A, with the most e￿cient operator only 1.9% better than the least
e￿cient operator. We spoke with engineers from both coal and gas plants who suggested that
operator decisions are likely to have more impact on e￿ciency at coal plants.
Unlike for Plants A and B, the operator e￿ects at Plants C, D and E (recall that they are all
owned by Firm X) were estimated to be small and statistically indistinguishable from zero. The
largest di￿erence between the best and worst shifts was .0020 (s.e. .0019) at Plant C. This point
estimate is an order of magnitude smaller than the similar measures at Plants A and B. Overall,
the results suggest there are no discernible di￿erences between the four shifts at any of Firm X’s
plants. It is instructive to consider why we might ￿nd di￿erences across operators at Plants A
and B, but not at Plants C, D and E. For one, the shift information that we received from Firm
8This calculation assumes the plant operates at a 90% capacity factor, with fuel costs of $25/MWh and that
the best operator worked for 10% of the time.
9The F-test for Plant A excludes operator 27, the operator e￿ect used to collect all hours when the operator
log was left blank.14
X is much less precise than the information for Plants A or B, so the estimates could be biased
to zero because of classical measurement error. For instance, since we only have information on
four shifts, the shifts were scheduled to work almost 2,200 hours per year. No doubt operators,
especially those with considerable seniority, are working much less than this per year, suggesting
that each shift contains more than a single operator. Also, as we noted in comparing Plant A to
Plant B, operators have less room to a￿ect e￿ciency at gas plants. Finally, plant personnel at
Plant C described an in-house computer program that they used to instruct operators about the
optimal setting for plants, suggesting that operators at the Firm X plants are less likely to make
di￿erent decisions about plant operations.
Note that there is reason to believe that all of the operators e￿ects we measured are biased
to zero. For one, we only have information on the operator and not the plant sta￿ supporting
him (all of the operators we have on record were male). It’s possible that we could see larger
di￿erences if we could control for the supporting sta￿ as well. Second, even for Plant A, where
we have operator log information, there may be measurement error in our independent variable.
The coe￿cient estimates on the control variables summarized in Table 2 are for the most
part as expected. For all plants except Plant A, the coe￿cient on ln(OUTPUT) are negative
and statistically signi￿cant, suggesting that plants are more fuel e￿cient at higher output levels.
Also, as would be expected if operators are reducing output in response to negative e￿ciency
shocks, instrumenting for ln(OUTPUT) causes the coe￿cient to fall towards zero. For example,
an OLS estimate of equation (1) using data on Plant B yields a coe￿cient on ln(OUTPUT) of
-.121 (s.e. = .002).10 Similarly, the coe￿cient on ￿ln(OUTPUT) is positive and statistically
signi￿cant at all plants, suggesting that increases in output degrade e￿ciency and reductions
improve e￿ciency.11 Also, the F-statistics on the ￿rst stages are large, suggesting that our
10The signi￿cance of the operator e￿ects are not sensitive to the estimates of ln(OUTPUT). In addition to the
speci￿cations we report, we also estimated other speci￿cations that allowed OUTPUT to take di￿erent nonlinear
forms. The estimates of the F-statistics on the operator e￿ects were qualitatively very similar, i.e. suggesting that
operators at Plants A and B di￿ered from one another but those at Firm X’s plants did not.
11We also estimate speci￿cations that allowed the e￿ect of an output change to di￿er for positive and negative
changes. Both e￿ects were positive, suggesting that a reduction in output does lead to a lower heat rate (more
e￿cient).15
instruments work quite well.
The coe￿cient estimates on TEMPERATURE are all positive and statistically signi￿cant,
consistent with what engineers told us to expect. Only two of the ￿ve DAY SHIFT variables are
signi￿cantly di￿erent from zero, and one is positive and small and the other is negative and quite
small (suggesting at most a .5% di￿erence across shifts). Except at Plant A, the STARTt￿X
for X ￿ 2;3;4 dummies are positive, suggesting that fuel e￿ciency is compromised after starts.
There were only 13 starts at Plant A, so these variables are imprecisely estimated. Also, since
starts are associated with rapid changes in output, the heat rate variable can be very noisy.
5 Labor Policies and Operator Performance
We have described the critical role that plant operators play in the operation of power plants,
and presented anecdotal and empirical evidence that operators can have a signi￿cant impact on
the e￿ciency of plant operations. Given this evidence, two important questions arise. Why is
such a variation in performance tolerated by ￿rms, and what can ￿rms do to take advantage of
the skills and experience of the strong performers?
5.1 Human Resource Policies
Aggregate statistics and our interviews with power plant managers both suggest that labor poli-
cies in electricity generation have been undergoing a dramatic transformation over the last 10-20
years. This transformation has coincided with the rise of non-utility power producers, the priva-
tization of publicly owned utilities outside of the U.S., and the advent of regulatory restructuring.
It is reasonable to conclude that the competitive pressures created by these developments pro-
vided the impetus for these changes. However, it is worth noting that these changes have not
been limited to regions where power plants have been divested or deregulated. Also, many
interviewees cited the adoption of automated monitoring technology beginning in the late 1980s
as a factor in the declining employment rates.16
In general, the historic labor picture at power plants was heavily unionized with in￿exible
work rules and promotion policies. There were several layers of job categories and restrictions
on utilizing employees in roles outside of their categories. Sta￿ng levels were also, by today’s
standards, quite high. Promotion was largely based upon tenure at a plant or with the company.
Certainly a minimum level of competence was required for promotion, particularly to the operator
level. However, among those employees able to exceed a certain minimum threshold of perfor-
mance, there was little e￿ort to di￿erentiate among the quality of employees when determining
promotions.
Since the mid 1980’s employment levels have steadily declined. Plant F, a coal-plant in
England visited for this project, is representative of this trend. There were 285 employees at
the plant when we visited, down from a peak of over 700 before the plant was privatized in the
early 1990’s. This trend is shared among most liberalized electricity markets, but not restricted
to those facing full competitive pressures. Plant G, a coal plant in Alabama also visited for
this project reported 320 employees in 2004, down from a peak of over 450 despite the fact that
its regulatory status has remained unchanged. Among the positions eliminated was a full-time
groundskeeper, cited to us as an example of previous excesses given the paucity of grass around
the plant.
As mentioned above, aggregate statistics suggest a pronounced reduction in power plant
employment throughout the U.S. These reductions are most pronounced in areas actively pursuing
some form of deregulation (see Fabrizio, Wolfram, and Rose, 2007). The largest reductions overall
appear to be a plants divested from regulated utilities to non-utility operators (see Bushnell and
Wolfram, 2006).
The reduction in employment has coincided, at least in restructured states, with a declining
in￿uence of unions and increasingly ￿exible work rules. In two separate interviews, managers
described how previously, a shift was sta￿ed with a number of specialists, including mill workers,
electricians and boilermakers. Union work rules prohibited job sharing. In the late 1990s,
management had been able to renegotiate union contracts, in some cases when the plants were17
divested to new owners, to allow workers to be classi￿ed generally as power plant operators. As
a result, workers at the restructured plants we visited were valued for their broad skill sets, and
sta￿ng levels fell.
According to managers at some plants, wage levels have in many cases risen as the number
of employees has been reduced and responsibilities expanded.12 Promotion policies have also
become less rigid. One operator at Plant F in England rose to his position in just over two years,
much faster than would have been possible under the plant’s previous tenure-based promotion
scheme. The merchant owner of Plant B replaced a large fraction of the employees it inherited
from the regulated utility when it purchased the plant, drawing its new employees largely from
ex-Navy technicians and engineers. By contrast, Firm X, also a merchant company operating
plants it had purchased from regulated utilities, has retained most of the employees at the plants
it purchased.
Despite these broad trends that indicate increasing productivity at power plants in liberalized
electricity markets, in most cases we found little focus on the quality of speci￿c employees, beyond
standard promotional policies. In particular, in most cases there were no speci￿c initiatives
designed to address the operator e￿ects on fuel e￿ciency that have been described above, despite
a widespread consensus that such e￿ects are meaningful. That said, there were some e￿orts at
linking bonuses to corporate or plant performance, and one speci￿c e￿ort to link employee pay
to the e￿ciency of the plant. We describe these programs below.
5.2 Performance Pay
All plants we visited paid bonuses to their employees loosely based upon some measure of per-
formance. In some cases, as with Plant G in Alabama, these bonuses were largely linked to
corporate ￿nancial performance and therefore were more a version of \pro￿t-sharing" than in-
centive pay. Bonuses at many plants also re￿ected conventional HR policies, such as a linkage
to favorable performance reviews by supervisors, the completion of assigned tasks on time, and
12Shanefelter (2006) uses BLS data to describe a picture consistent with these claims.18
limited absenteeism. In several cases, such as Plant F, bonuses were linked to aggregate mea-
sures of plant’s performance, such as the achievement of certain fuel e￿ciency and availability
targets. For the most part, however, such bonuses did not attempt to distinguish between the
performance of speci￿c employees within a given plant.
One notable exception to these policies was a performance pay initiative attempted at Plant
F in England in the mid 1990’s. Plant F is a large coal-￿red plant that had been built by the
government-owned Central Electricity Generation Board (CEGB) and privatized in the early
1990s. The plant has since changed hands multiple times. Since before privatization, substantial
e￿orts were made to monitor and document the plant’s performance along a large number of
e￿ciency measures. These e￿orts evolved into an automated system able to monitor, quantify,
and report the \cost of [e￿ciency] losses" at the plant. The cost of losses calculation was highly
sophisticated and attempted to control for all relevant exogenous impacts on plant operations,
such as fuel quality, ambient temperature, and the output level of the plant. It generated detailed
reports breaking down e￿ciency losses to speci￿c processes within the plant.13 Initially (and
currently) these data were aggregated into monthly performance reports and utilized by managers
as a general tool for helping to focus e￿ciency e￿orts. These measures would be reviewed at
monthly meetings of all section heads, including representatives from operations, commercial
performance, and maintenance.
In 1995, managers attempted to utilize the cost of losses system in a more direct fashion by
linking it to performance bonuses for speci￿c shifts. Recognizing the disparity in performance
and losses between shifts, manager’s believed that the incentives provided by such a linkage would
help to focus under-performing operators and shifts and help to improve their e￿ciency at least
to levels attained by higher performing shifts. In doing so, managers implicitly expressed a belief
that these performance disparities were largely e￿ort-based, rather than a result of di￿erences
in the inherent acumen or talent of the operators. The pay di￿erentials created by the bonuses
were still quite modest, amounting to about 1 percent of annual pay.
13The cost of losses report would decomposes performance measures to report the losses due to several factors
including turbine losses, boiler e￿ciency, fuel feed trains, and exhaust pressure.19
Even with this modest incentive, however, managers did notice marked changes in perfor-
mance between shifts. Unfortunately they were not the kinds of e￿ects that they intended to
induce. The incentive scheme was based upon the relative performance in the cost of losses of
each shift. Operators quickly discovered that a degradation in the performance of other shifts
could be as rewarding as an increase in their own e￿ciency. It appears that there are more
and easier options for sabotaging other shifts than for improving own performance. Managers
found that operators would sometimes avoid blowing soot throughout their shift, forcing excessive
blowing upon the next shift, or triggering all the blowers simultaneously at the very end of their
shift, leaving the next shift to deal with the resulting residue. In such an environment there was
growing acrimony between shifts and operators. Eventually, managers at Plant F dropped the
incentive scheme, and shifted toward a system of rewarding the pooled performance of all shifts.
Although the direct in￿uence of individual e￿ort and performance on such pooled incentives is
diluted, managers claimed that e￿ciency improved roughly half a percent under this new scheme.
5.3 Combustion Optimization Software
The experiment with performance pay at Plant F can be viewed as an attempt to elevate the
e￿ciency of under-performing operators at least up to the level observed in the better operators
by applying incentives intended to increase focus and e￿ort. A more recent trend at power
plants may also result in more balanced performance among operators by reducing the impact of
their individual performance. This trend is the adoption of automated combustion optimization
software and systems. In general these systems use learning algorithms to attempt to customize
operating protocols to the speci￿c idiosyncrasies of a speci￿c plant. The more ambitious of these
systems take much of the in￿uence over burner angles, fuel ￿ow, oxygen content, etc. out of the
hands of the operator. In theory such systems should reduce the disparities between operator
performance. Indeed, the vendor of one such system, NeuCo, claims that its systems can help
to ‘make the worst operator at least as good as the best.’ The adoption of these systems is still
in its early stages, and we were not able to attain su￿cient data to adequately evaluate such20
claims.
However, two factors that were raised during our interviews indicate that, at least in the near
future, the impact of such systems on fuel e￿ciency may be small. First, these systems are being
utilized primarily for the purpose of reducing emissions, rather than improving fuel e￿ciency.
Second, in many cases operators have been hostile to yielding control over operations to these
systems. In one plant we visited, an installed control system had been converted to an ‘advisory
mode’ that provided recommendations, but direct control was left to the human operator.
That said, managers at the Firm X plants ￿rmly believed that the optimization systems they
had installed would signi￿cantly reduce if not eliminate any operator e￿ects. Our empirical
analysis supports their view. By contrast, Plant B installed a NeuCo system in the middle of
our sample period. The system had been installed to help the plant address NOx emissions,
rather than fuel e￿ciency. When we included a dummy variable equal to one after the adoption
of the optimization software, we did not detect a statistically signi￿cant impact on either the
overall fuel e￿ciency of the units or on the relative operator e￿ects at the plant, although we
observed only nine operators who worked before and after the installation.
6 Conclusions
Labor policies in the electricity industry have been signi￿cantly impacted by its historical status
as either a publicly owned or regulated utility business. At the same time, evaluating and
improving labor practices may have been given low priority due to the fact that labor costs
constitute a small portion of industry costs. We present evidence that, despite the fact that
overall labor costs are small, the quality of certain workers can have a signi￿cant impact on the
operations of power plants. Power plant operators, in particular, can in￿uence the fuel-e￿ciency
of the plants under their control in a myriad of individually small, but in aggregate consequential,
ways. There is good reason to believe that this e￿ect is more prominent in the more complex
coal facilities than in gas-￿red power plants.21
In our examination of performance data from U.S. power plants we ￿nd that the individual
operators could in￿uence fuel e￿ciency by more than 3%. While this ￿gure may sound modest,
it translates into a di￿erence worth millions of dollars in annual fuel costs at larger facilities.
Despite what appears to be a widespread belief in an ‘operator e￿ect’ amongst plant managers,
there have been relatively few attempts to address the impacts of these e￿ects. We have docu-
mented one failed attempt at performance-based incentive pay, and described how the advent of
automated combustion optimization systems may reduce or eliminate operator e￿ects. Even the
roll-out of such automated systems has been relatively slow, and more focused on environmental
considerations than on e￿ciency concerns. It is worth noting that market incentives have only
recently been introduced in the industry. The process of regulatory restructuring is less than a
decade old in most of the world, and this is a relatively short-time in a historically slow moving
industry. It remains to be seen whether ￿rms facing more exposure to market incentives will
prove to be more adept at taking advantage of operator e￿ects, or whether such e￿ects are an
immutable characteristic of the power generation business.
More generally, our results provide a clean measure of the extent of worker heterogeneity
within the same job description at a particular plant. It is possible that other industries would
show less heterogeneity, perhaps because labor practices have received little attention in the elec-
tricity industry relative to other industries where labor is a larger fraction of overall employment.
It is also possible that the true heterogeneity across workers would be larger in other industries,
and the fact that managers have clean measures of worker output in electricity helps keep it
in check. For example, Mas and Moretti (2007) report a 21% di￿erence between supermarket
cashiers in the top and bottom deciles. At any rate, worker heterogeneity is not ordinarily cap-
tured in descriptions of ￿rm e￿ciency based on production functions, but may be an important
component of technical e￿ciency di￿erences across ￿rms.22
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Data Appendix
Our primary data sources are BaseCase and PowerDat, two databases produced by Platts
(see www.Platts.com). Platt’s compiles data on power plant operations and characteristics from
numerous public sources, performs limited data cleaning and data analysis and creates cross
references so that the data sets can be linked by numerous characteristics (e.g. power plant
unit, state, grid control area, etc.). We relied on information from Platts for the following broad
categories.
Unit Operating Pro￿le
BaseCase contains hourly power-plant unit-level information derived from the Continuous
Emissions Monitoring System (CEMS) database collected by the Environmental Protection
Agency. The EPA assembles this detailed, high quality data to support various emissions trad-
ing programs. The CEMS data are collected for all fossil-fueled power plant units that operate
more than a certain number of hours a year. The dataset contains hourly reports on heat input,
gross electricity output and pollutant output. We calculate the heat rate by dividing heat input
(measured in mmBtus) by gross electricity output (measured in MWh). By construction of the
heat rate variable, our sample is limited to hours in which the unit was producing positive gross
electricity output.
System-level Demand Characteristics
Data on system level demand are taken from the PowerDat database, also compiled by Platts.
These data report the monthly minimum, maximum, mean,and standard deviation of load by
utility, as well as the average daily maximum over a month. Platts compiles this information
from survey data collected by the EIA and reported in its form 714.
Plant and Unit Characteristics
Unit characteristics are taken from the \Base Generating Units" and \Estimated Fossil-Fired
Operations" data sets within BaseCase.
We merged data from Platts to several additional sources.25
Shift Schedules
We obtained shift schedules from three companies covering operations at ￿ve power plants.
For Plant A company personnel transcribed entries from the operator logs for one unit at the
plant for 2003. Though there are two approximately 1000 MW units at Plant A, each unit has its
own control room and its own operator at any given hour. Plant operators are asked to sign into
the log when they begin their shift. For Plant B, a gas plant with two units, company personnel
sent us three years worth of spreadsheets with the planned shift schedules. The plant operator
controls both units at the same time. The information we have from Firm X is the sparsest.
Company personnel gave us two single page printouts with the schedules for the four di￿erent
shifts over two years. The same shift schedules apply to all three of Plant X’s plants in the same
Western state. This means that shift A is always working at the same time at all three plants,
but the employees on shift A at plant 1 are di￿erent from the employees on shift A at plant 2,
and the composition of shift A at a particular plant no doubt varies over time.
Ambient Temperature-Hourly
We obtained hourly temperature data by weather station from the Unedited Local Climatolog-
ical Data Hourly Observations data set put out by the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric
Administration. Further documentation is available at:
http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/documentlibrary/ulcd/lcdudocumentation.txt
We calculated the Euclidean distance between each weather station-power plant combination,
using the latitude and longitude for each power plant and for each weather station. Then, for
each month, we found the weather station closest to each power plant that had more than 300
valid temperature observations. For hours when the temperature was missing, we interpolated

















Units under Operator’s 
Control 
1 2  2 7 1 
Unit(s) Characteristics        
   Size (MW)  950  700  700  2000  250 
   Primary Fuel  Coal  Gas  Gas  Gas & Oil  Gas 
   Year Installed  1975  1965  1965  1955-1970  1965 
          
Operating Statistics        
   Average Capacity Factor  
   (%) 
90 56  43 43 45 
   Starts/year  14  26  31  42  6 
          
   Efficiency (MMBtu/MWh)           
        Average  8.9  10.2  10.5  11.4  10.4 
        Std. Dev.  .5  1.0  3.7  3.8  1.3 
   Positive Output (MW)           
        Average  826  181  144  184  92 
        Std. Dev.  110  82  93  163  60 
   Outputt/Outputt-1            
        Average  1.02  1.05  1.08  1.06  1.02 
        Std. Dev.  .85  .78  1.00  .73  .27 
          
   Combustion Optimization 
   In Use ? 
No In  later 
periods 
In-house version 
        
Shift Schedule Information        





   Period covered  2003  2001-2003  2002-2003 
   Shift length  8 hour  12 hour  12 hour 





          
 N  7,578  33,490  18,003  28,790  15,339 
 
Note: Unit size rounded to 50MW increments, and unit installation years rounded to half-decade.    
 
27
Table 2: Efficiency Regressions 













-0.040 -0.119*** -0.118*** -0.191***  -0.071***  ln(Output) 
(0.040) (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) 
0.084*** 0.051***  0.039***  0.024*** 0.022***  ∆ln(Output)  
(0.019) (0.003)  (0.007)  (0.006) (0.007) 
-0.141 0.327*** 0.278***  0.222***  0.261***  Startt-2 
(0.132) (0.021)  (0.079)  (0.038) (0.055) 
-0.155** 0.143***  0.096**  0.077*** 0.091***  Startt-3 
(0.074) (0.013)  (0.043)  (0.015) (0.024) 
-0.061 0.060***  0.083*  0.035***  0.045***  Startt-4 
(0.051) (0.009)  (0.043)  (0.007) (0.015) 
-0.008 <0.001 -0.004***  0.002* -0.001  Day Shift 
(0.006) (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
-0.001         Evening Shift 
(0.007)        
0.0005*** 0.0003***  0.0005***  0.0003*** 0.0007***  Temperature  
(0.0002) (0.00009)  (0.00006)  (0.00008) (0.0001) 
Number of distinct operators   11  16  4  4  4 
          












          
N 7,578  33,490  18,003  28,790  15,339 
          
 
All specifications estimated using instrumental variables with ln(State Load) and ∆ln(State Load) used as 
instruments for ln(Output) and ∆ln(Output).  Unit fixed effects are included where operators control multi-
unit plants and year-effects are included where data span multiple years.  Standard errors (in 
parentheses) are robust to serial correlation within a day. 
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level 
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Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Employment, Hours and Earnings from the Current 
Employment Statistics” survey.    
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Note: The red squares are drawn at the estimated αi from equation (1) for each operator, while the blue lines are drawn over the 
95% confidence interval.  Low values of αi indicate that an operator achieved a lower average heat rate, i.e., was more efficient, 
relative to the least efficient operator (Operator 4).  
 

























































Note: See Figure 2. 